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PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST 
MANUFACTURERS OF LEAD-BASED PAINT: A 
RESPONSE TO THE LEAD PAINT MANUFACTURERS' 
ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THEIR LIABILITY BY SEEKING 
ABROGATION OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY 
Diane Cabo Freniere* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
You are what you eat. Statistics show that an overwhelming num-
ber of toddlers who live in deteriorating housing built before World 
War II eat lead paint. 1 Specifically, the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services estimates that, as of July 1988, twelve 
million children under the age of seven resided in housing with lead 
at potentially toxic levels. 2 Consumption of lead paint chips, even in 
small amounts, may result in lead paint poisoning.3 Moreover, be-
cause lead paint poisoning is commonly misdiagnosed and therefore 
left untreated,4 the disease often has devastating effects on children. 
These effects include mental retardation, convulsive seizures, blind-
ness, diminished IQ leading to learning deficiency, behavioral prob-
lems, kidney dysfunction, epilepsy, anemia, and death. 5 
• Solicitations Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 See generally D.J. BICKNELL, PICA: A CHILDHOOD SYMPTOM (1975); U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1988) [hereinafter LEAD POISONING REPORT]. 
See also infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
2 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; see also infra notes 23-25 and accompanying 
text. 
3 See Chisolm, Lead Poisoning, 224 SCI. AM. Feb. 1971, at 15, 21; see also infra note 22 
and accompanying text. 
4 See CHANNING L. BETE CO., INC., WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNow ABOUT LEAD 
POISONING 5 (1989) (on file at Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, Jamaica Plain, 
Mass.). 
5 Chisolm, supra note 3, at 22-23; Lin-Fu, Childhood Lead Poisoning: An Eradicable 
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Initially, personal injury litigation focused on the landlord as the 
defendant. 6 Landlords, however, often lacked sufficient assets or 
insurance to pay damages awarded to successful plaintiffs. More 
recently, plaintiffs have sued the manufacturers of lead paint on 
various product liability theories, including negligent product design, 
negligent failure to warn, and breach of warranty.7 The Trial Law-
yers for Public Justice conducted an investigation that uncovered 
evidence supporting these product liability actions. 8 The evidence 
showed that the lead paint manufacturers continued to market their 
product even though they knew, since the early 1930s, that lead 
posed a danger if ingested by children. 9 This information prompted 
actions against the lead industry directly for personal injury as well 
as property damage. 1o As a result, lead paint manufacturers have 
attempted to limit their liability by counterclaiming for contribution 
against a child's parents based on a theory of negligent parental 
supervision. 11 Alternatively, when a child's parents are not named 
individually as plaintiffs in an action, the lead paint manufacturers 
may implead the parents as third-party defendants. 12 
The lead paint industry's attempts to limit its liability by implead-
ing or counterclaiming for parental contribution raise two important 
issues. First, in the counterclaim scenario, the issue arises as to 
whether child victims can directly sue their parents for negligent 
parental supervision, given that lead paint manufacturers can di-
Disease, 17 CHILDREN 2 (Jan.-Feb. 1970); Needleman, Schell, Bellinger, Leviton & Allred, 
The Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low Doses of Lead in Childhood, NEW ENG. J. 
MEDICINE, Jan. 1990, at 83-88 [hereinafter Needleman]. Some of these effects are reversible 
if the lead is removed from the child's body via chelation treatment. Chisolm, supra note 3, 
at 22-23. 
6 See infra notes 56-104 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 105-113 and accompanying text. 
s See 2 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 739 (Dec. 2, 1987). 
9 [d. The Lead Industry Association (LIA) responded to this evidence by emphasizing that 
it repeatedly has been the first to recognize and investigate health problems associated with 
lead paint. See id. More specifically, since 1955, the LIA voluntarily reduced the amount of 
lead pigment in interior paint. LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-5. Additionally, 
the LIA conducted campaigns aimed at informing the public of the hazards of lead paint, 
assisted in developing screening programs, and supported constructive legislation at every 
level of government. 2 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 739 (Dec. 2, 1987). 
10 See Santiago v. N.L. Indus., No. 87-2799-T (D. Mass. filed Nov. 17, 1987); Christopher 
v. Duffy, No. 55183 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County filed Nov. 17, 1987); LeBlanc v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., No. 86-35232 (Mass. Super. Ct., Worcester County filed Aug. 15, 1986); Spriggs 
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. LE 3121-S87 (Mass. Housing Ct., Hamden County filed Nov. 
17, 1987). The above four cases were filed but not decided as of the publication of this Article. 
11 See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text. 
12 See Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 408 Mass. 792, 563 N.E.2d 684 (1990) (defendant-landlord in a 
lead paint case allowed to implead parent, seeking contribution for the child's alleged injuries). 
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rectly sue the parents for the same. Second, in the impleader scen-
ario, it is questionable whether lead paint manufacturers can join a 
child's parents as defendants despite the parent-child immunity doc-
trine, which generally bars actions between parents and minor chil-
dren. 
This Comment explores the new trend in lead paint litigation 
toward suing the lead paint manufacturers. Section II of this Com-
ment discusses the development of lead paint litigation by examining 
state and federal legislative prevention methods, as well as repre-
sentative private actions against landlords. 13 Section III introduces 
the recent attempts by plaintiffs to target lead paint manufacturers 
as defendants, and the industry's response of seeking contribution 
from children's parents. 14 Section IV then discusses the parent-child 
immunity doctrine as a potential obstacle confronting manufacturers 
who attempt to implead or counterclaim against children's parents. IS 
Section V identifies how federal and state legislation, as well as 
judicial resolution of suits brought against landlords, have been in-
effective in eliminating the lead source and, thus, childhood lead 
paint poisoning. 16 Section V also analyzes the manufacturers' prob-
able success in impleading children's parents in an effort to limit 
their liability in light of the current parent-child immunity doctrine. 17 
Finally, Section V proposes a comprehensive, nationwide lead paint 
removal effort comprised of an interim uniform judicial response18 
and permanent state and federal legislation. 19 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LEAD PAINT POISONING LITIGATION 
A. Causes and Effects of Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning 
Lead pervades our environment, and wherever lead is found, it is 
potentially toxic.20 The primary cause of lead poisoning in older urban 
areas of the United States is the ingestion of paint chips.21 Ingestion 
of lead paint chips causes the most severe type of lead poisoning 
13 See infra notes 20-104 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 124-210 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 211-28 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 229-45 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 246-70 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 271-80 and accompanying text. 
20 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note I, at 1-1. 
21 See id. at 1-3. The five other environmental sources of lead are: gasoline, food, water, 
stationary sources, and dust and soil from lead chips or air fallout. [d. at 6, 1-3. 
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because the chips contain an extremely high concentration of lead 
per unit of weight.22 The most common characteristics of suscepti-
bility to lead paint poisoning through ingestion of paint chips include: 
a toddler exhibiting normal hand-to-mouth exploration or teething;23 
a toddler living in deteriorating, pre-1940 housing;24 and a toddler 
with parents that have inadequate emotional resources, intellectual 
resources, informational resources, or economic resources. 25 
Repeated ingestion of even small amounts of lead paint chips will 
cause lead poisoning.26 Once ingested, lead enters the blood stream,27 
where the human body excretes as much lead as possible.28 When 
the quantity of lead surpasses the level that the body can excrete, 
the lead accumulates and deposits in a child's soft tissue and bone. 29 
The effect on young children can be especially devastating because 
the primary targets for lead poisoning are the brain and the central 
nervous system. 30 
In its early stages, the symptoms of lead paint poisoning are not 
easily detectable. 31 Doctors often mistake typical early symptoms, 
22 [d. at 1-40. "A chip of paint about the size of an adult's thumbnail can contain between 
50 and 100 milligrams of lead, and so a child eating a few small chips a day easily ingests 100 
or more times the tolerable adult intake of the meta!!" Chisolm, supra note 3, at 21. An 
estimated 52% of all residential housing units contain painted surfaces with lead at or exceeding 
0.7 mg lead/cm2, a level judged hazardous if ingested by young children. LEAD POISONING 
REPORT, supra note 1, at VI-13. 
28 Telephone interview with Mary Jean Brown, Assistant Director for the Department of 
Public Health, Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, Massachusetts Department of 
Health and Human Services, in Boston, Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 1989). Some authorities have 
identified "pica" as the cause of childhood lead paint chip ingestion. "Pica" is the habitual, 
purposeful, and compulsive search for ingestion of unnatural, non-food substances such as 
peeling paint, plaster, and putty. D. J. BICKNELL, supra note 1, at 4. An alternate view, and 
one espoused by Brown, is that teething toddlers naturally experiment by putting most 
anything into their mouths. Telephone interview with Mary Jean Brown, Assistant Director 
for the Department of Public Health, Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, Mas-
sachusetts Department of Health and Human Services, in Boston, Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 
1989). Lead paint becomes even more enticing when the child realizes that the chips have a 
lemon flavor. [d. 
:u Chisolm, supra note 3, at 21. The United States Department of Health and Human 
Services estimates that 99% of all housing built prior to 1940 has paint with lead greater than 
or equal to 0.7 mg/cm2. LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at VI-13. Additionally, 70% 
of the housing built between 1940 and 1959, and 20% of the housing built between 1960 and 
1974, have paint with lead content greater than 0.7 mg/cm2. [d. 
26 Chisolm, supra note 3, at 21. 
26 [d. 
2:1 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at III-5. 
28 See id. at III-7. 
29 [d.; Chisolm, supra note 3, at 17. 
30 See LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-5 to 1-6. 
Sl U. S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING LEAD POISONING IN YOUNG 
CHILDREN 3 (1985) [hereinafter PREVENTING LEAD POISONING]. 
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which include fatigue, irritability, constipation, poor appetite, sleep 
disorders, and headaches, for the flu or other childhood illnesses. 32 
Later, more serious symptoms arise, including stomach aches and 
cramps, frequent vomiting, weakness, clumsiness, and loss of re-
cently acquired skills.33 Doctors often misdiagnose these symptoms 
as attention disorders or learning disability.34 Because of the inherent 
difficulty in diagnosing children with lead poisoning, federal and state 
lawmakers have enacted legislation that attempts to prevent lead 
paint poisoning by eliminating the toxin from a child's environment. 
B. Legislative Prevention Measures 
Prevention of lead paint exposure is classified commonly as either 
a primary or a secondary prevention method. 35 Primary lead paint 
poisoning prevention measures, the preferred approach, consist of 
discontinuing the use of lead paint and removing old paint from 
housing units and public buildings.36 Secondary lead paint poisoning 
prevention measures are reactive, occurring after toxicity is identi-
fied, and include preventing children's access to paint flakes, mini-
mizing children's contact with lead in dust and soil, screening for 
lead exposure, and conducting nutritional assessments. 37 Secondary 
prevention measures also include legal actions and legislative re-
strictions. 38 
1. Federal Legislative Response to Prevent Lead Paint Exposure 
Despite federal regulatory action in the early 1970s limiting fur-
ther introduction of lead into the environment, lead paint already 
present in private housing and in public buildings has remained 
unaffected. The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act of 1971 
(LPPPA)39 authorized the Department of Housing and Urban De-
32 CHANNING L. BETE CO., supra note 4, at 5. 
33 Id. 
34 PREVENTING LEAD POISONING, supra note 31, at 3; see also Chisolm, supra note 3, at 
2I. 
36 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-I. 
36 Id. at IX-2. 
37 Id. 
3B I d. at IX -2 table IX-I. 
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (1988). Title I of the Act, id. § 4801, provided funding for 
screening programs, educational programs, and treatment of those children identified as 
suffering from lead paint poisoning. Pub. L. No. 91-695, § 101, 84 Stat. 2078 (1971) (repealed 
1978). Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4811, provided funding for identification and abatement 
of structures containing lead-based paint beyond the allowable standard. Pub. L. No. 91-695, 
§ 201, 84 Stat. 2078 (1971) (repealed 1978). Title III provides for research and development 
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velopment (HUD) to eliminate existing lead paint in public housing 
and in other federally assisted housing. 40 The LPPPA also restricted 
the future use of lead paint in residential structures constructed or 
rehabilitated by the federal government or with federal assistance. 41 
Because HUD's jurisdiction is limited to federally constructed or 
funded housing, HUD could not direct federal action at the private-
housing sector beyond mandating the allowable lead content as a dry 
solid of paint sold in stores. 42 In December 1974, the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission mandated a reduction of lead in paint 
sold in stores to 0.5%, which was subsequently lowered to the pres-
ent standard, 0.06%, of lead as a dry solid.43 Although this mandate 
affected the future introduction of lead into the private housing 
market, it did not require abatement of preexisting lead paint. 44 
During 1986 and 1987, HUD enacted new regulations that ex-
panded its involvement in lead paint hazard elimination. The 1986 
regulation requires inspection of lead paint surfaces in public and 
Indian housing. 45 In i987, HUD enacted two rules designed to reduce 
the lead paint hazard. One rule requires inspection for lead paint 
surfaces upon a change in ownership in Federal Housing Adminis-
tration (FHA) housing built in or prior to 1978.46 The second rule 
requires community grant-based, federally assisted program appli-
cants to conduct lead paint inspection, testing, and abatement where 
necessary in order to receive program funds. 47 
Collectively, these three rules provide a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme affecting a variety of public housing markets under HUD's 
of programs to combat this problem. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4822. Title IV prohibits future use of 
lead paint in residential structures constructed or rehabilitated by the federal government or 
with federal assistance. Id. § 4831(b). This Title was amended in 1973 to require the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to set up procedures to abate lead paint in 
the existing housing units under their jurisdiction. Id. § 4822. See also LEAD POISONING 
REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-5. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 4822. 
41 Id. § 4831(b). 
42 Id. § 4841(B)(ii). 
43 See id. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has prohibited the interstate 
shipment of paint containing more thanO.06% lead if it is intended for use in the interior of 
houses. 16 C.F. R. § 1500. 17(a)(6)(i)(A) (1989). By the late 1950s, however, many manufacturers 
of lead paint had voluntarily reduced the percentage of lead in interior paint products to one 
percent of lead as a dry solid. LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-5. 
44 Id. at IX-4 to IX-5. Section 4831 of the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act 
(LPPPA) also prohibits use of lead-based paints in application to cooking, drinking, or eating 
utensils as well as to toys or furniture articles. 42 U.S.C. § 4831. 
45 24 C.F.R. §§ 905.107(0, 965.701-.711 (1989). 
45 24 C.F.R. §§ 35.1, 35.56 (1989). 
47 24 C.F.R. § 570.608 (1989). 
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jurisdiction. The economic impact of these regulations is severe. The 
United States Department of Health and Human Services estimates 
that approximately 308,000 public housing units require lead removal 
at a cost in excess of $380 million.48 These figures, admittedly ex-
treme, do not include estimates for lead paint abatement in the 
private housing market, which remains federally unregulated beyond 
the allowable percentage of lead as a dry solid in paint sold in the 
United States. Regulation of lead paint abatement in the private 
housing market has been left to state and local lawmakers. 
2. State Legislative Response to Prevent Lead Paint Exposure 
Many state and local governments have enacted legislation defin-
ing "lead-based paint," as well as prohibiting its application to var-
ious interior and exterior surfaces accessible to children.49 A state's 
definition of lead-based paint is relevant to controlling the level at 
which a particular jurisdiction will require lead removal. 50 For ex-
ample, N ew York prohibits the application of paint containing more 
than one half of one percent of lead base per total weight of the dry 
solid to any interior surface, window, or porch of a residence. 51 
Further, N ew York requires prompt abatement of lead poisoning 
conditions where paint with a lead content exceeding this standard 
is detected. 52 
Typically, states assess penalties if lead paint is applied to surfaces 
in violation of the state statute or if a landlord refuses to abate an 
identified lead hazard. Maryland law provides that the illegal use of 
lead paint is a misdemeanor penalized by a fine of no greater than 
one thousand dollars and/or imprisonment not to exceed thirty 
days. 53 New York law assesses a penalty not to exceed $2500 to any 
landlord violating an order to abate "a paint condition conducive to 
lead poisoning."54 Further, New York law contains a receivership 
provision through which an officer may be appointed to receive rents 
48 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-7 to IX-8. 
49 See, e.g., MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 6-301 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 196 
(West 1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1370, 1372 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1990). 
50 The state's definition of lead-based paint does not control the allowable lead content in 
paint manufactured and sold within its jurisdiction. The 1973 amendment to the LPPPA set 
this standard at 0.06%, which preempts any state definition of lead-based paint in this area. 
51 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1372 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1990). 
52 I d. § 1373. 
53 MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 6-302 (1987). 
54 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1374 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1990). 
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from the rental premises and apply those rents to the lead abatement 
costs. 55 
C. Private Causes of Actions Against Landlords 
1. Statutory Duties of an Owner-Landlord 
Various state public health statutes grant tenants the right to sue 
their landlords for damages resulting from lead paint poisoning. For 
example, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 111, section 199, 
permits tenants of rental property to sue owners for actual and 
punitive damages when such owners, after having been notified of a 
dangerous level of lead in paint, fail to take corrective measures. 56 
Likewise, Louisiana's Public Health and Safety title sets out the 
Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act. 57 This Act im-
poses a duty on an owner of any residential property to remove 
paint, plaster, or other accessible materials that contain dangerous 
levels of lead upon notification by a state health officer. 58 This duty 
applies wherever a child under the age of six or a mentally retarded 
person resides. 59 Further, an owner shall be liable for all damages 
caused by his or her failure to perform the required lead hazard 
abatement. 60 
Several plaintiffs have sued their landlords basing their claim on 
a statutory duty. In Acosta v. Irdank Realty COrp.,61 the plaintiffs 
sued their landlord realty corporation for negligence after their in-
fant daughter contracted lead paint poisoning by ingesting paint that 
had fallen from the peeling walls of their apartment. 62 The New York 
Supreme Court reasoned that the landlord had a statutory duty to 
maintain the premises in proper repair based on the requirements 
55 ld. 
66 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 199 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989). The statute provides 
in relevant part: 
ld. 
The owner of any residential premises who is notified of a dangerous level of lead in 
paint, plaster, soil or other material present upon his premises . . . who does not 
satisfactorily correct or remove said dangerous conditions shall . . . be subject to 
punitive damages, which shall be treble the actual damages found. 
57 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.26(a)-.29 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). 
68 ld. § 40:1299.27. 
59 ld. 
60 ld. § 40:1299.29. 
61 38 Misc. 2d 859,238 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
62 ld. at 859-60,238 N.Y.S.2d at 714. 
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of the New York Multiple Dwelling Law.68 More significantly, the 
court held that the cracked apartment walls presented a danger to 
the child that the landlord reasonably could have foreseen. 64 In reach-
ing this decision, the court based its reasoning on a common-knowl-
edge analysis.65 This analysis rested on two well-known facts: first, 
children attempt to eat almost anything within their reach that will 
fit into their mouths; second, some household paints contain lead 
paint that may cause lead paint poisoning in children when in-
gested.66 Thus, the court held that the landlord's negligence in failing 
to maintain the apartment in proper repair proximately caused the 
child's injuries. 67 
2. Common-Law Duties of an Owner-Landlord 
Generally, at common law an owner-landlord owes no duty to 
repair defective conditions that exist at the time of the lease sign-
ing.68 Private tort actions brought by injured tenants against land-
lordS, however, have prompted some courts to fashion exceptions to 
this general rule. Thus, actions against landlords asserting various 
negligence claims have been resolved with mixed results.69 Results 
have varied significantly because courts have differed over basic 
negligence elements, including whether the landlord had a duty to 
repair and inspect the rental property, whether that duty was 
breached, and whether the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably 
foreseeable. 
Two early decisions, Montgomery v. Cantelli70 and Kolojeski v. 
JoknDeischer, Inc.,7l denied landlord liability, finding that a landlord 
had no duty to repair the rental premises. In Montgomery, a father 
sued his landlord, on behalf of his deceased minor son, for injuries 
incurred by the child after he ingested lead p8int chips off of the 
dried and cracked front door of the rental residence.72 The Louisiana 
68 Id. at 860,238 N.Y.S.2d at 714; see also Bencosme v. Kokoras, 400 Mass. 40, 41-44, 507 
N.E.2d 748, 749-50 (1987). 
&( Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., 38 Misc. 2d at 860,238 N.Y.S.2d at 714-15. 
66 See id. 
66 Id. 
fIT See id., 238 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
68 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 63, at 434 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
89 See infra notes 70-104 and accompanying text. 
70 174 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App.), em. denied, 247 La. 1082, 176 So. 2d 143 (1965). 
71 429 Pa. 191, 239 A.2d 329 (1968). 
72 Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So. 2d at 239. The father also sued individually for damages 
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Court of Appeal reasoned that it would be overly burdensome to 
impose a duty upon the landlord to maintain the exterior of the 
rental property free from dried or cracked paint. 73 Further, the court 
reasoned that eating paint off of the front door was an extraordinary 
use of the premises that the landlord could not reasonably have 
foreseen. 74 Therefore, although the landlord's inaction was a cause-
in-fact of the child's injury, the court found that it was not the 
proximate cause. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff had 
no cause of action against the landlord for negligence because the 
landlord had no duty, and the injury to the minor child was unfore-
seeable. 75 
Similarly, in Kolojeski, the parents of a two-year-old girl sued 
their landlord after their child died as a result of ingesting lead paint 
chips off of the woodwork in the living room.76 The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania reasoned that, absent any provision in the lease or 
a statutory requirement, the landlord had no duty to make repairs 
or inspect the premises for fitness. 77 Additionally, in denying landlord 
liability, the court reasoned that the landlord's use of lead paint did 
not constitute negligence because a finding of negligence would 
wrongfully impute to the landlord a special knowledge and expertise 
about the dangers of lead paint. 78 
In contrast, other cases decided within the same time frame as 
Montgomery and Kolojeski recognized a landlord's duty to repair 
incurred by himself as a result of his child's lead poisoning. The landlord's insurance company, 
Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, was also a named defendanfin the suit. [d. 
73 [d. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the landlord had a duty arising from 
statutory requirements of the Louisiana Civil Code, reasoning that those statutory require-
ments applied only to passers-by of the premises who incurred injuries resulting from the 
property's disrepair. Statutory requirements, where applicable, have been effective in estab-
lishing a landlord's duty to repair. [d. 
74 [d. The court reasoned that "[sluch gastronomic culinary impulses are, to say the least, 
abnormal and unexpected, and could not reasonably be anticipated by the lessor." [d. 
75 [d. at 240-41. 
76 Kolojeski v. John Deisher, Inc., 429 Pa. 191, 192-93, 239 A.2d 329, 330 (1968). The 
parents alleged the following: negligent failure to maintain the apartment in proper living 
condition, negligent failure to inspect the apartment adequately to ensure the safety of the 
tenants, negligent failure to inform tenants of the dangerous lead paint that was applied to 
the living room woodwork, negligent use of lead paint, and negligent failure to remove and/ 
or remedy the peeling paint. [d. at 193, 239 A.2d at 330. 
77 [d. at 194, 239 A.2d at 330. The court stated that a landlord would be liable only if he 
or she knowingly created a dangerous condition by using lead paint on the premises and the 
tenant had no knowledge of the condition. [d. at 195, 239 A.2d at 330-31. 
78 [d. at 195, 239 A.2d at 331. The court recognized that at the time of the relevant 
poisoning, only those people with special training or experience would have known that the 
use of lead paint was potentially dangerous to young children if ingested. See id. 
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and inspect rental premises. In Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance 
CO.,79 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana revisited the 
issue of a landlord's duty to repair.80 Here, the plaintiff sued the 
landlord-owner of his apartment building for personal injuries suf-
fered by his two sons resulting from the ingestion of lead paint chips 
that had fallen from the inside walls of the rental premises. 81 The 
court held that the landlord had a duty to maintain the apartment 
in a "safe and livable condition. "82 Further, with respect to the issue 
of proximate cause, the court held that when a child was poisoned 
after ingesting lead paint chips from within the apartment, the 
landlord's negligence was a legal cause of the child's injuries.83 The 
court distinguished this situation from instances when a child con-
tracts lead paint poisoning by ingesting paint chips from areas out-
side of the rented apartment. 84 In the latter circumstance, the M ont-
gomery doctrine applied and the landlord would not be liable. 85 
In Weaver v. Arthur A. Schneider Realty CO.,86 the Missouri 
Supreme Court implicitly recognized a landlord's duty to maintain a 
common hallway in repair.87 In Weaver, a sixteen-month-old child 
ingested lead-laden plaster that had fallen from the ceiling and walls 
79 223 So. 2d 912 (La. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 257 La. 523, 242 So. 2d 839, 
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971). 
80 See Davis, 223 So. 2d at 918. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana had 
recently addressed the issue of a landlord's duty to maintain and/or inspect the rental premises 
in Montgomery v. Cantelli, 174 So. 2d 238, 240 (La. Ct. App. 1965), holding that no duty 
existed. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
81 Davis, 223 So. 2d at 914. 
82 Id. at 918. 
83 See id. at 916. The court reasoned that "it does not seem unreasonable to place a greater 
burden upon him [the landlord] to keep this condition from occurring within the premises 
itself when it is known that small children will thereby be constantly exposed to the temptation 
of eating this fallen material." Id. 
84 Id. at 914, 916. 
85 Id. at 916. The court concluded it would be unreasonable to hold a landlord liable when 
a child ingested lead paint from the outside of a leased apartment unit. The court reasoned 
that in those areas outside of the rental premises, for example a common hallway, the resulting 
poisoning would be so extraordinary that it would prevent a landlord's conduct from being 
the proximate cause of a child's injuries. Id.; see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying 
text. 
86 381 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1964) (en banc). 
87 See id. at 867-68. Other courts have imposed a level of duty higher than the law normally 
imposes on a landlord when a landlord contracted with a tenant to eliminate all hazardous 
conditions. See, e.g., Dunson v. Friedlander Realty, 369 So. 2d 792, 795-96 (Ala. 1979). The 
Dunson court reasoned that the landlord had undertaken a higher duty than the law imposed 
by entering into an agreement with the tenant to eliminate lead paint from his apartment. 
However, the court held that it was unreasonable to expect a landlord to foresee that a child 
would ingest and be injured by lead paint chips. Id. at 795. 
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of a common hallway.88 Although the court recognized the landlord's 
general duty to maintain common areas in repair, the court did not 
hold the particular landlord liable. The court reasoned that the land-
lord's negligent failure to maintain a safe hallway was not the prox-
imate cause of the child's injuries because the injury to the child 
from ingesting lead plaster in a common area was highly extraordi-
nary. 89 
More recently, Norwood v. Lazarus90 examined the issue of fore-
seeability in the lead paint context. In Norwood, a child contracted 
lead paint poisoning by ingesting paint chips from the floor of a 
common hallway where she occasionally played alone. 91 The landlord 
had not maintained the common area in proper repair, thereby vio-
lating his common-law duty.92 Furthermore, the landlord had seen 
the child playing in the hallway.93 The Missouri Court of Appeals 
acknowledged the natural propensity of children to put literally any-
thing they can reach into their mouths. 94 Additionally, the court 
reasoned that, when children are involved, a landlord's exercise of 
"ordinary care" requires a greater degree of caution than that re-
quired when only adults are involved. 95 Thus, the court held that 
the child's conduct and her resultant injury were not highly extraor-
dinary.96 The court determined there was proximate cause and al-
lowed the child to recover. 
Some landlords have raised the parents' contributory negligence 
as an affirmative defense to these negligence charges. In Davis v. 
Royal-Globe Insurance COS.,97 the Louisiana Court of Appeal ex-
pressed its opinion that negligent parental supervision possibly could 
88 381 S. W.2d at 866-67. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that it should adopt the 
common-knowledge analysis used in Acosta v. [rdank Realty Corp., 38 Misc. 2d 859,860,238 
N.Y.S.2d 713,714-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). The court distinguished Acosta on the basis of 
the existence of the New York Multiple Dwelling Law and the difference in location of the 
occurrence of lead poisoning. Weaver, 381 S.W.2d at 867. The court reasoned that although 
the landlord had a common-law duty to keep common areas in repair, it was unforeseeable 
that the child would be injured in this way in a common area. [d. Alternatively, if the injury 
occurred within the leased apartment unit, the landlord had no general common law duty to 
repair the apartment although it was foreseeable for a child to be injured when in his or her 
home. See id. at 866-68; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 63, at 434. 
89 Weaver, 381 S. W.2d at 869. 
90 634 S. W.2d 584 (Mo. App. 1982). 
91 [d. at 585-86. 
92 [d. at 586; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 63, at 440. 
93 Norwood, 634 S.W.2d at 586. 
94 [d. at 587. 
96 [d. 
96 [d. at 588. 
97 223 So. 2d 912 (La. Ct. App. 1969). 
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contribute to a child's injuries. 98 The court recognized that the par-
ents' contributory negligence cannot be imputed to their child,99 but 
it anticipated a situation in which the parents' failure to supervise 
the child properly would be a superseding cause of the child's inju-
ries. 100 In Caroline v. Reicher,101 a defendant-landlord affirmatively 
pled that the parents' failure to supervise their child constituted 
superseding negligence. 102 The Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned 
that the parents' negligence would relieve the landlord of liability 
only in extraordinary situations.103 Because the parents' conduct did 
not reach the "extraordinary" threshold, the court found that their 
negligence did not constitute an independent and superseding cause 
of the child's injuries. 104 
As is evident from the diverse reasonings employed by courts 
across the United States in resolving these actions, there are few 
predictable results for plaintiffs bringing private actions against 
their landlords. Because most statutes impose a duty on the landlord 
to abate a lead paint hazard, establish the grounds for breach of that 
duty, and presume foreseeability of the injury, plaintiffs with a 
statutory basis for their action are more likely to be able to recover 
for their injuries than plaintiffs tasked with establishing the common-
law elements of duty, breach, and causation. 
III. CURRENT Focus OF LEAD PAINT LITIGATION: SUITS 
TARGETING PAINT MANUFACTURERS 
A. Products Liability Actions 
August 1986 marked a change in lead paint litigation brought about 
by an action filed in Massachusetts directly against the lead paint 
manufacturers. 105 This initial suit was followed by three separate 
98 [d. at 918. 
99 [d. 
100 [d. 
101 269 Md. 125, 304 A.2d 831 (1973). 
102 [d. at 128, 304 A.2d at 833. 
103 [d. at 130, 304 A.2d at 834. 
104 [d. at 130-31, 304 A.2d at 834. The court held that the evidence presented concerning 
whether the parents' negligence constituted a superseding cause left only one conclusion, and 
thus the court decided the issue as a matter of law. [d. at 131, 304 A.2d at 834. The court 
stated that if the facts of a case placed it in a middle ground, then the issue of superseding 
negligence must be determined by the trier of fact. [d. 
105 See LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 86-35232 (Mass. Super. Ct., Worcester County 
filed Aug. 15, 1986). 
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actions against the lead paint manufacturers in November 1987.106 
Each of the complaints alleged that the lead paint manufacturers 
were responsible for poisoning children who were exposed to lead 
paint. 107 An investigation conducted by the Trial Lawyers for Public 
Justice (TLPJ) prompted this initial attack against the lead industry. 
The TLPJ's investigation uncovered evidence that manufacturers 
were aware lead paint could cause danger to small children if in-
gested, and that, despite this knowledge, the industry continued to 
market its product. 108 
The Massachusetts litigation pending against the lead paint man-
ufacturers and the Lead Industry Association (LIA) alleges three 
causes of action on the basis of negligent product design, negligent 
failure to warn, and breach of warranty.109 The negligent product 
design claim states that the poisoning of the children was the prox-
imate and foreseeable result of the lead paint manufacturers' efforts 
to manufacture and market lead-based paint that they knew, or 
should have known,· would be applied to surfaces of residences in 
which children reside. 110 The three-prong claim for negligent failure 
106 See Santiago v. N.L. Indus., No. 87-2799-T (D. Mass. filed Nov. 17, 1987); Christopher 
v. Duffy, No. 55183 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County filed Nov. 17, 1987); Spriggs v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., No. LE 3121-S87 (Mass. Housing Ct., Hamden County filed Nov. 17, 1987). 
107 The four products liability suits each allege negligent product design, negligent failure 
to warn, and breach of warranty. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint at 21-29, 
LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 86-35232 (Mass. Super. Ct., Worcester County filed 
Aug. 15, 1986). 
lOS See McKhann & Vogt, Lead Poisoning in Children, 101 J.A.M.A. 1131 & n.5 (1933). 
The evidence appeared in an article published in a 1933 issue of the Journal of American 
Medical Association that presented information provided by the LIA verifying the industry's 
awareness of the dangers of lead paint if ingested by children. This evidence has also prompted 
property damage suits by the City of New York in June 1989 and the Housing Authority of 
New Orleans in March 1989, each seeking compensation for lead abatement costs. See Gould 
v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans, No. 87-9685 (Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish filed May 29, 1987); 
City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 14365/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York City filed 
June 8, 1989); see also Blum, New Orleans Case a "Message?": Suit Targets Paint Manufac-
turer, Nat'l L.J., May 8, 1989, at 17. The Housing Authority of New Orleans impleaded paint 
manufacturers as third-party defendants to ongoing litigation, seeking full indemnity or sub-
stantial contribution from the producers for the costs of lead paint abatement. See Blum, New 
York Suit: Get the Lead Out, Nat'l L.J., June 26, 1989, at 45. Likewise, New York City 
brought a $50 million suit directly against the lead manufacturers to recover their abatement 
costs. [d. The lead industry claims these city-plaintiffs are trying to shift the blame for their 
own poor maintenance. [d. 
109 See Santiago v. N.L. Indus., No. 87-2799-T (D. Mass. filed Nov. 17, 1987); Christopher 
v. Duffy, No. 55183 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County filed Nov. 17, 1987); LeBlanc v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., No. 86-35232 (Mass. Super. Ct., Worcester County filed Aug. 15, 1986); Spriggs 
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. LE 3121-S87 (Mass. Housing Ct., Hamden County filed Nov. 
17, 1987). 
lIO E.g., Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint at 24-25, LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 
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to warn argues that the lead paint manufacturers had a duty to: (1) 
warn retailers and users that their product contained lead paint that 
should not be applied to surfaces exposed to young children; (2) give 
notice to parents of children living in housing painted with their lead-
based products; and (3) issue a complete and timely public warning 
advising of the dangers that lead paint posed to young children if 
ingested. l11 
The breach of warranty claim argues that the lead paint manufac-
turers breached their warranty that their product was safe and fit 
for its intended use of painting inside and outside surfaces around 
the home. 112 Moreover, this claim states that the lead paint manu-
facturers conspired with each other to conceal information and mis-
lead retailers and users, including parents of young children, con-
cerning the extreme and unreasonable risks associated with lead 
paint if ingested by young children. 113 In response to these allega-
tions and in accord with the tactics employed by the defendant 
landlords in Davis and Caroline, the lead paint manufacturers have 
sought to limit their liability by counterclaiming against the child's 
parents. 
B. Industry Counterclaims Against Parents for Contribution 
The defendant lead paint manufacturers in these cases have denied 
the allegations114 and have pled affirmatively that: the negligence of 
the plaintiffs, in whole or in part, caused the injuries sustained;115 if 
the child was poisoned by the defendants' product, then the product 
was not unreasonably dangerous standing alone, but was made haz-
ardous by subsequent improper maintenance or by subsequent un-
foreseeable abnormal use of the product;116 and the product was not 
knowingly unreasonably dangerous to children, if properly used, 
No. 86-35232 (Mass. Super. Ct., Worcester County Mar. 29, 1989) transferred from No. 87-
CV-0036 (Mass. Housing Ct., Worcester Div. filed Aug. 15, 1986) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Third 
Amended Complaint]. 
111 [d. at 25-26. 
112 [d. at 26-28. 
113 [d. at 27. 
114 Defendant Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.'s Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, With 
Counterclaim at 6-8, LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 86-35232 (Mass. Super. Ct., 
Worcester County filed Feb. 24, 1987), transferredfrom No. 87-CV-0036 (Mass. Housing Ct., 
Worcester Div. filed Aug. 15, 1986) [hereinafter Defendant's Answer]. 
115 [d. at 8. They also affirmatively pled that, if an implied or express warranty exists, 
then the plaintiffs did not reasonably notify the defendant of any breach of warranty. [d. 
116 [d. at 10-11. 
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when produced and marketed. 11; Additionally, the lead paint manu-
facturers have counterclaimed against one of the children's mothers, 
who was named individually as a plaintiff in LeBlanc v. Sherwin-
Williams CO.118 
The counterclaim in LeBlanc alleges that the mother was negligent 
in caring for her children because she rented an apartment that she 
knew contained lead paint, and failed to prevent her children from 
eating lead paint. 119 The counterclaim also alleges that the mother 
negligently failed to supervise her children, and thus proximately 
caused the children's injuries. 120 Other lead paint manufacturers will 
probably follow this strategy to seek contribution from a child's 
mother based on a theory of comparative negligence. 
LeBlanc provides an example of a case with a manufacturer that 
was very likely to counterclaim for contribution because the parent 
was already a named plaintiff in the litigation. 121 Although this coun-
terclaim does not create direct adversity between the parent and 
the child, it does present a dilemma. Specifically, if the manufacturer 
is permitted to sue the parent for contributory negligence, then 
nothing would prevent the child from suing his or her parents di-
rectly for his or her injuries. 
Such a possible suit between child and parent arises because in a 
negligence suit for contribution, a successful manufacturer must 
establish that a parent breached a legally imposed duty to care for 
his or her child, thus contributing to the child's injuries. 122 If a 
manufacturer succeeds in establishing parental negligence, then it 
is likely that in future actions child-plaintiffs would sue both the 
parent and the lead paint manufacturer. This result, although logical, 
presents practical difficulties in jurisdictions that subscribe to some 
variation of parental immunity. 123 
Alternatively, when the parent is not a named plaintiff, the man-
ufacturer is likely to implead the parents for contribution. This 
117 Id. at 12. 
118 Id. at 12-14. If the mother had not been named individually as a plaintiff, the defendants 
would have impleaded her as a third party defendant in order to seek contribution. This result 
is particularly likely in Massachusetts given its recent Supreme Judicial Court's decision 
allowing the impleader of a parent in a lead paint suit brought against a homeownerllandlord. 
See Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 408 Mass. 792, 795-796, 563 N.E.2d 684 (1990). 
;19 I d. at 13. 
120 Defendant's Answer, supra note 114, at 13. 
121 See Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, supra note 110, at 1. 
122 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 44, at 302. "The question is always one of 
whether the [lead paint manufacturer] is to be relieved of responsibility, [either in part or in 
whole], and [its] liability superseded, by the subsequent event [parental negligence]." Id. 
123 See infra notes 124-210. 
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action, in effect, brings the parents in as co-defendants and creates 
actual adversity between the plaintiff-child and the now defendant-
parent. This situation, more directly than the counterclaim scenario, 
immediately implicates the parent-child immunity doctrine. 
IV. JUDICIAL CREATION, EVOLUTION, AND ABROGATION OF THE 
PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
The parent-child immunity doctrine poses a potential problem to 
the lead paint manufacturers' attempt to limit their liability by im-
pleading or counterclaiming against the plaintiff-children's par-
ents. l24 The parent-child immunity doctrine was not always expressly 
recognized at common law in either England or the United States. 125 
In the United States, it was not until the late nineteenth century 
that a child sued his or her own parent to recover damages for 
tortious injuries inflicted by the parent. 126 
In the 1891 case of H ewellette v. George,127 the Mississippi Supreme 
Court created the doctrine of parental immunity, which a majority 
of jurisdictions in the United States later followed. l28 In H ewellette, 
an unemancipated minor brought an action against her mother for 
wrongful confinement in an insane asylum. l29 Without citing any 
authority, the court reasoned that family harmony and public policy 
precluded a minor child from suing his or her parent for personal 
injuries. lao Thus, the preservation of family harmony as a sound 
124 The parent-child immunity doctrine is a general rule barring actions between parent 
and minor child for all personal torts. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 122, at 904. 
126 Id. At English common law, a parent and child were separate legal entities. Thus, a 
child could sue and be sued based on ownership of property, as well as sue and be sued based 
on tortious injuries incurred by another or inflicted upon another. Id. 
126 See Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891) (first American case 
denying child's recovery against parent based on parent-child immunity doctrine); see also 
Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 489, 491-93 (hesitancy to bring such suits likely caused by colonial America's "history 
of almost unbridled parental authority"). 
127 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). 
128 Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 122, at 904. 
129 Hewellette, 68 Miss. at 704, 9 So. at 885-86. The plaintiff was married but living apart 
from her husband. From the evidence on record, it was unclear whether the plaintiff had 
returned to her mother's house or whether the relationship of unemancipated child to parent 
existed. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887. 
130 Id. The court stated: 
Id. 
The peace of society, and of families composing society, and a sound public policy, 
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid 
to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress 
for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its 
criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from the parental violence and 
wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand. 
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public policy emerged as the first rationale for denying a personal 
injury action by an unemancipated minor against his or her parent. 
Subsequent cases expanded the possible rationales supporting the 
parent-child immunity doctrine. 131 These rationales included: the pro-
tection of a common law parental right to control and discipline 
children,132 the analogy between interspousal immunity and parental 
immunity,l33 the preservation of family finances,l34 and the likelihood 
of inheritance by the tortfeasor if the child predeceases the parent. 135 
During the ensuing years, courts have refuted the fundamental 
rationales supporting the doctrine of parental immunity136 as a result 
of changing social views. 137 Partial abrogation of the parent-child 
immunity doctrine and judicially created exceptions to it produced a 
maze of inconsistent and even contradictory rulings. More recently, 
131 See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (child barred from suing 
her father and stepmother for cruel and inhuman treatment); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 
79 P. 788 (1905) (daughter, who had been raped by her father, could not sue him for her 
injuries). 
132 McKelvey, 111 Tenn. at 389-90,77 S.W. at 664. The court reasoned that parents would 
only forfeit their common-law right to control and discipline their child by committing gross 
parental misconduct. I d., 77 S. W. at 664. Further, the court stated that, even if the parents' 
conduct was found to be gross misconduct, their child would have no civil redress. I d., 77 
S.W. at 664. The proper redress was in criminal law only, with a remedy furnished by writ 
of habeas corpus. Id., 77 S.W. at 664. 
133 See id. at 391, 77 S. W. at 665. The doctrine of interspousal immunity prevents a husband 
or wife from suing the other based on the common-law notion of unity of identity. PROSSER 
& KEETON, supra note 68, § 122, at 901-02. Because the common law did not recognize the 
husband and wife as separate legal entities, it was deemed impossible to have the requisite 
legal controversy between two spouses. Id. 
134 Roller, 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789. The court reasoned that payment of any judgment 
would deplete family funds, which is contrary to the public policy interest to maintain family 
financial stability. I d. 
135 Id. The court reasoned that it would be an absurd scenario if a child were awarded 
damages from a parent and subsequently predeceased that parent. The parent would then 
become the heir to the awarded damages taken from him or her. I d. 
136 See, e.g., Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437-39, 245 N.E.2d 192, 192-93, 297 
N.Y.S.2d 529, 530-32 (1969). The fundamental rationales were expounded in the trilogy of 
cases, Hewellette, McKelvey, and Roller. See Roller, 37 Wash. at 243-46, 79 P. at 788-89; 
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. at 389-92,77 S.W. at 664-65; Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 
9 So. 885, 887 (1891). For a complete discussion refuting these fundamental rationales of the 
parental immunity doctrine see Note, Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.: North Carolina Retains Its 
Partial Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1457, 1461-63 (1987). 
137 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 122, at 906-07. As a result of the trilogy of cases, 
the doctrine of parental immunity constituted an absolute bar to all personal injury actions 
brought by a child against his or her parent. At the turn of the century, however, American 
society elevated the status of children. Children, previously viewed as their parents' property, 
were emerging as individuals with rights and privileges of their own. This new legal status 
presented difficulties for many courts applying the parental immunity doctrine. As a result, 
courts began to fashion exceptions to the doctrine reflecting their dissatisfaction with the rigid 
results achieved in application of the absolute rule. Id. 
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the trend has been toward comprehensive change, including general 
abrogation of parental immunity. 138 
To date, a substantial majority of states have abrogated the doc-
trine of parental immunity either in part or entirely.139 Currently, 
courts maintain eight jurisdictional approaches to parental immunity. 
These approaches include: partial abrogation when the parent-child 
relationship has been abandoned or terminated;140 partial abrogation 
for automobile negligence cases;141 partial abrogation granting im-
munity only when duty arises solely from the parent-child relation-
ship;142 general abrogation except when negligence involves an ex-
ercise of parental authority or reasonable parental discretion with 
respect to the provision of basic legal needs such as food, clothing, 
housing, medical and dental services, and other care rising to the 
level of legal necessity;143 general abrogation replaced with a reason-
able parent standard;144 and general abrogation replaced with the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts view, in which the parent-child rela-
tionship alone is not a basis for complete immunity, but rather certain 
parental privileges give rise to immunity.145 At the two extremes 
138 See infra notes 139-206 and accompanying text. 
139 Only 14 states have retained absolute parental immunity when the child's injuries are 
caused by the parent's negligence. They include: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, and Wyoming. 
140 See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. 
141 See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 
86, 89, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (1970) (en banc); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976); 
Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067-70 (Fla. 1982); Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 109 Idaho 
849, 854, 712 P.2d 550, 555-59, (1985); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 767-70, 611 
P.2d 135, 141-42 (1980); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont. 173, 177-81, 656 P.2d 
820, 823-24 (1983); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 366-67 (N.D-. 1967); Unah v. Martin, 
676 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Okla. 1984); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016-17 (R.I. 1982); Smith v. 
Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 185-86, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194-95 (1971); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 
2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980) (en banc); Lee v. Comer, 159 W. Va. 585, 590-93, 224 
S.E.2d 721, 724-25 (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 1-539.21 (1983 & Supp. 1989). 
142 See, e.g., Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68,70,372 N.E.2d 1127,1128-29 (1978); 
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 49-51, 324 N.E.2d 338,345-46,364 N.Y.S.2d 859,870-
72 (1974). 
143 See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1981); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 
S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972); 
Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 546-48, 461 A.2d 1145,1152-53 (1983); Felderhoffv. Felderhoff, 
473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402,413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 
(1963). 
144 See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 
(1971) (en banc); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595,599-601 (Minn. 1980). 
146 See, e.g., Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 420-21 (D.C. 1987); Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 
718, 719, 681 P.2d 776, 784-86 (1984). 
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are nine states that either never adopted parental immunity or have 
entirely abrogated the doctrine,146 and fourteen states that have 
retained the parent-child immunity doctrine absolutely when a par-
ent's negligence caused a child's injuries. 147 
Several courts have fashioned partial exceptions to the parent-
child immunity doctrine in cases when the parent-child relationship 
has been abandoned temporarily.l48 Some jurisdictions have deter-
mined that the parent-child relationship is abandoned when a parent 
maliciously or intentionally injures his or her child,149 or when a 
parent's gross negligence causes such injury.l50 Additionally, if a 
child was injured in the employ of his or her parent, then some 
courts have reasoned that the parent temporarily abandoned the 
parent-child relationship and replaced it with an employer-employee 
relationship.151 A parent, as an employer, owes his or her child a 
public duty of care to provide reasonably safe working conditions. 152 
Likewise, courts have created exceptions to the parent-child im-
munity doctrine when the parent-child relationship has been termi-
nated. For example, some courts have found no basis for immunity 
146 See, e.g., Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 487-88, 462 P.2d 1007, 
1008-09 (1969); Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 401 Mass. 762, 764-65, 519 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 
(1988); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404-05, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017-18 (1974); Briere v. 
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 
439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N. Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 
326, 330, 474 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379-84, 282 A.2d 351,355-
57 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 137, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111-12 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 
135 Vt. 119, 121-22, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (1977). 
147 See supra note 139. 
148 See infra notes 153-54. The parental immunity doctrine originally was designed to shield 
the family from overly intrusive judicial meddling. No reason existed to enforce this immunity 
when the familial relationship was either absent or terminated. See PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 68, § 122, at 906. 
149 See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 429~0, 289 P.2d 218, 223-24 (1955) (en 
banc); Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974) (en banc); Wright v. 
Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 726-27, 70 S.E.2d 152, 155-56'(1952); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 
61, 67-69, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1950); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 362-64, 150 A. 905, 910-
11 (1930); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 930~1 (Tex. 1971). 
150 See, e.g., Leggett v. Leggett, 216 N. Y.S.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (driving while 
intoxicated considered gross negligence). 
151 See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 421-24, 378 P.2d 640, 642-43 (1963); 
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 364-71, 150 A. 905, 911-14 (1930); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 
473 S. W.2d 928, 93~3 (Tex. 1971). 
152 See, e.g., Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 366, 150 A. at 912. Other courts have allowed actions if 
the child is not an employee of the parent, but the parent is performing a business transaction 
at the time the child is injured. See Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 401 Mass. 762, 764, 519 N.E.2d 
1299, 1300-01 (1988) (child's hand crushed in electric dough rolling machine when mother took 
daughter to work with her at pizza restaurant); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 577, 103 
N.E.2d 743, 748-49 (1952) (child burned when father's gasoline pump exploded). 
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if the child was emancipated at the time of the injury. 153 Other courts 
have held that when the tortfeasor-parent died, the parent-child 
relationship ceased, and thus the need for immunity ceased. l54 Ad-
ditionally, if a tortfeasor-parent caused the death of the other parent 
or of the child, then some courts have established a wrongful death 
exception to immunity because parental conduct destroyed the fa-
milial relationship. 155 
A second theory under which courts have created exceptions to 
parental immunity is in automobile negligence cases if insurance 
coverage exists. 156 The rationale of these cases is that, if parents are 
insured, they will not incur direct financial responsibility, and there-
fore the court need not worry about disrupting family harmony. 157 
The third theory that a minority of courts have used is to limit 
parental immunity to situations when the duty arises solely from the 
parent-child or familial relationship.158 Thus, when a parent owes a 
general duty to the public at large, separate from the familial duty, 
153 See, e.g., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 253-54, 288 P.2d 868, 873 
(1955); Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 31, 94 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1956); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 
631, 636-38, 354 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (1962); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 244, 79 P. 788, 
788 (1905) (respondent's assertion). 
154 See, e.g., Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S. W.2d 68, 73 (Mo. 1960) (en banc); Sisler v. 
Seeberger, 23 Wash. App. 612, 614-15, 596 P.2d 1362, 1363-64 (1979). 
155 See, e.g., Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482,483-84 (Ky. 1961) (administrator 
of a deceased infant's estate could sue parent for wrongful death); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 
231, 246-47, 330 A.2d 335, 344 (1974) (son permitted to recover from father who was respon-
sible for mother's death). But see Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 84-85, 85 So.2d 807, 
809-10 (1956) (daughter unable to maintain wrongful death action against father responsible 
for mother's death). 
156 See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976) (doctrine of parental 
immunity inapplicable to the extent that damages were covered by parents' automobile in-
surance); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067-70 (Fla. 1982). Opponents of parental immunity 
argue that awarding damages from insurance coverage rather than directly tapping family 
funds promotes family harmony through financial stability. Note, supra note 136, at 1463. 
Proponents of parental immunity argue that insurance coverage encourages fraudulent claims 
among family members. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 122, at 905. 
157 See, e.g., Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 21, 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 (1939). Other courts 
refused to consider the existence of liability insurance as a basis for creating an exception to 
the parental immunity rule. See, e.g., Fidelity Sav. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 605, 32 
N.W.2d 613,614 (1948); Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 650, 294 N.W. 33, 35 (1940). These 
courts reasoned that the existence of liability insurance should not be determinative of whether 
a child may maintain an action. 
158 See, e.g., Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 13-14, 623 P.2d 800, 802-03 (1981) (court 
found parents immune from liability because failure to safeguard their child's outdoor play 
area was a breach of their parental duty as distinguished from their public duty to "care and 
control" their child); Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N. Y.2d 35, 49-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 345-46, 364 
N.Y.S.2d 859,870-72 (1974) (court held parent has no duty to supervise child and thus is not 
amenable to suit for negligent supervision). 
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courts will not grant immunity merely because the parent-child re-
lationship exists. 159 In Holodook v. Spencer,160 the New York Court 
of Appeals applied this approach to a case of negligent parental 
supervision. In Holodook, a four-year-old child was struck by an 
automobile after running into the street from between parked cars. 161 
The court reasoned that the parents had no public duty to supervise 
their child162 and held that, because parental supervision was 
uniquely a familial duty, immunity would apply, and no action arose 
against either parent for negligent supervision. 163 
During the early 1960s, changing social views encouraged courts 
to fashion progressive rules of general abrogation, affording a child-
plaintiff greater rights against his or her parent-tortfeasor. After 
seventy years of fashioning exceptions to the absolute rule of paren-
tal immunity, the Wisconsin Supreme Court abrogated the parent-
child immunity doctrine and replaced it with two specific immunities 
in Goller v. White. l64 Goller involved a twelve-year-old foster child 
who sustained injuries when a bolt projecting from a wheel of a 
tractor driven by his father caught the leg of his pants. 165 The child 
sued his foster father for negligently allowing him to ride on the 
drawbar of the tractor and for failing to warn him that several bolts 
protruded from one of the wheels. l66 In finding the father negligent, 
the court abolished the doctrine of parental immunity in all personal-
injury actions except "[ w ]here the alleged negligent act involves an 
exercise of parental authority over the child," or "where the alleged 
negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion 
with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and 
dental services, and other care."167 Numerous courts, seeking to 
balance a parent's right to exercise authority and discretion with the 
169 See, e.g., Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 49-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 345-46, 364 
N.Y.S.2d 859,870-72; see also Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68,70,372 N.W.2d 1127, 
1128-29 (1978) (court held mother liable for her child's injuries because they resulted from 
the mother's breach of a general public duty to trim trees on property so that motorists had 
unobstructed view); Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Corp., 378 N.Y.S.2d 417,419,51 A.D.2d 
542, 543 (1976) (duty to maintain explosives non-negligently is duty owed to public at large 
and is not a duty emanating from the familial relationship). 
160 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338,364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). 
161 Id. at 42,324 N.E.2d at 341,364 N.Y.S.2d at 864. 
162 Id. at 50-51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 346 N. Y.S.2d at 871. 
163 Id. at 51,324 N.E.2d at 346,364 N.Y.S.2d at 872. 
164 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). 
166 Id. at 404, 122 N.W.2d at 193. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 193. 
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child's right to recover for tortious injury, have adopted this fourth 
approach. 168 
The Goller court did not define the limits of these specific excep-
tions to parental immunity, and thus subsequent courts have varied 
widely in their definition. 169 Specifically, courts have had great dif-
ficulty determining whether actions for negligent parental supervi-
sion are properly within the purview of the exceptions in Goller. 170 
One line of reasoning expansively construes the Goller exceptions, 171 
while the contrary line narrowly interprets these exceptions. 172 
Under an expansive reading of the Goller exceptions, several 
courts have granted parental immunity in instances of negligent 
168 See, e.g., Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 12-13, 623 P.2d 800,801-02 (1981). While 
most courts have not adopted the Goller exceptions verbatim, they adhere with slight modi-
fications. See, e.g., Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971) (court abrogated the 
doctrine of parental immunity except "(I) where the negligent act relied on for recovery 
involves the reasonable exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged 
negligent act involves the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to provisions 
for the care and necessities of the child."); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 
172-73 (1972) (court abrogated the doctrine of parental immunity adopting all of the Goller v. 
White text except replacing "ordinary parental discretion" with "reasonable parental discre-
tion"); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 244, 330 A.2d 335,342-43 (1974) (court limited immunity 
to matters concerning the "exercise of parental authority and adequacy of child care"). One 
court adopted the Goller text in full. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 
638 (1968). It was later overruled in Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), where 
the court adopted the reasonable parent standard. 
169 Compare Paige v. Bing Construction Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 484-86, 233 N.W.2d 46, 
48-49 (1975) (court held parents' failure to warn child of the dangers of playing in construction 
area was within the scope of the parental authority exception, and thereby parents were 
immune from suit) with Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 
245-47, 201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972) (court held mother's failure to supervise three-year-old 
son was not included in the "other care" exception when the child suffered severe brain 
damage after he ran into a busy street and was struck by a bus); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 633-35, 177 N.W.2d 866, 868-69 (1970) (court allowed action against 
mother who negligently supervised her child while the child was playing on a swing set). 
170 See cases cited supra notes 168-69. 
171 See, e.g., Paige, 61 Mich. App. at 484-86, 233 N.W.2d at 48-49 (failure to supervise 
two-year-old daughter while on construction site fell within the parents' right to exercise 
authority over the child); Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352,353-54 (1972) 
(parents immune from negligence claim by child who was burned after biting electrical cord 
because using an extension cord was an act of ordinary parental discretion with respect to 
housing or other care); Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 546-48, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152-53 (1983) 
(parental immunity will continue in cases of negligent supervision, but immunity will not 
remain when parents willfully or wantonly fail to supervise their child); Lemmen v. Servais, 
39 Wis. 2d 75, 79-80, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968) (failure to instruct young child properly on 
the safety procedures in leaving a school bus and crossing a highway fell within the exercise 
of ordinary parental discretion with respect to other care of the child). 
172 See, e.g., Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Ky. 1982); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & 
Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 245-47, 201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972); Cole v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 633-35, 177 N.W.2d 866,868-69 (1970). 
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parental supervision, but have relied on different reasoning to reach 
the same result.173 Some courts have reasoned that the parental 
authority clause of the Goller test embraces negligent parental su-
pervision. For example, in Paige v. Bing Construction Co., 174 the 
Michigan Court of Appeals stated that a parent's exercise of author-
ity goes beyond mere discipline. 175 Specifically, a parent's exercise 
of authority includes educating and instructing his or her child to be 
aware of dangers necessary to protect the child's well-being. 176 
Other courts have reasoned that the parental discretion clause 
with respect to housing embraces negligent parental supervision. In 
Cherry v. Cherry,177 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the 
defendant-parents were immune from a negligence claim brought by 
their child, who was severely burned after biting an electrical cord. 178 
The court reasoned that the act of using an extension cord for a 
living room lamp was an act of ordinary parental discretion with 
respect to housing.179 As such, the act was protected under the 
exceptions to total abrogation of parental immunity. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in perhaps an aberrant decision, 
has also held that the clause in the Goller test relating to parental 
discretion embraces negligent parental supervision. 180 In Lemmen v. 
Servais,181 a six-year-old child was struck by an automobile when 
exiting from her school bus. 182 The court reasoned that the parent's 
failure to instruct their daughter on the safety procedures in exiting 
173 See cases cited supra note 172. 
174 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975). 
175 [d. at 484, 233 N.W.2d at 48. 
176 [d. 
177 295 Minn. 93, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972). 
178 [d. at 94-95,203 N.W.2d at 353. 
179 [d. 
ISO Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 79-80, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968). The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin's holding in Lemmen has never been expressly overruled. However, 
subsequent Wisconsin court decisions narrowly construed the Goller exceptions such that they 
do not apply to a parent's negligent failure to supervise or instruct a child on safety principles. 
See, e.g., Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62, 201 N.W.2d 825,832 (1972) (mother liable 
for negligent supervision when her child was injured by another child operating a lawn mower); 
Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 245-47, 201 N.W.2d 745, 
753 (1972) (parent's failure to supervise three-year-old son who was injured after running into 
a busy street was held actionable); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 633-35, 
177 N.W.2d 866, 868-69 (1970) (mother liable for negligent supervision of two-year-old child 
injured while playing on a swing set). Yet, by not overruling the Lemmen decision, the court 
may be leaving itself open to a more expansive interpretation of the Goller exceptions when 
the "right" case presents itself. 
181 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968). 
182 [d. at 76-77, 159 N.W.2d at 342-43. The plaintiff-child sued the school bus company's 
insurance company, which, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the child's parents. 
[d. 
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a school bus fell within the exercise of ordinary parental discretion 
with respect to the other care exception. 183 Thus, the court held that 
the parents would not be held negligent in any respect. Further, 
some courts have applied absolute parental immunity in cases of 
simple negligent supervision, and only entertained actions when a 
parent willfully or wantonly failed to supervise his or her child. 184 
In contrast, under a narrow reading of the Goller exceptions, 
parents are not immune from suit when they negligently fail to 
supervise or educate their children with respect to matters of 
safety.l85 For example, in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban 
Transport Co. ,186 a three-year-old boy and his mother sued a trans-
port company whose bus struck the boy when he ran into the 
street. 187 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reasoned that the paren-
tal care sought to be excluded is not the general daily care one gives 
to his or her child. l88 Moreover, if this type of parental care were 
meant to be excluded, the new rule would grant blanket immunity 
much like the old immunity.189 Thus, the court held that the term 
"other care" in the second Goller exception should be interpreted 
narrowly, and was not intended to include ordinary acts of upbring-
ing, whether supervisory or educational. 19o Hence, according to the 
narrow standard announced in Thoreson, the exercise of parental 
discretion with respect to food, clothing, housing, medical and dental 
services, and other care includes only those minor provisions that a 
parent is legally obligated to furnish. 191 Furthermore, an exercise of 
parental authority includes only acts of parental discipline. 192 
California has adopted a fifth type of parental immunity abroga-
tion. 193 The California Supreme Court, frustrated by arbitrary ex-
188 [d. at 78-80, 159 N. W.2d at 343-44. 
184 Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 547-48, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152-53 (1983). The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey felt its holding in Foldi was "a reasonable compromise between two 
legitimate aims-a parent's right to raise, free of judicial interference, his or her child as he 
or she deems best, and a child's right to receive redress for wrongs done to him or her." [d. 
185 See, e.g., Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 247, 201 
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). 
186 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972). 
187 [d. at 233,201 N.W.2d at 747. 
188 [d. at 247,201 N.W.2d at 753. 
189 [d. 
190 See id. The court stated: "The exclusion is limited to legal obligations, and a parent who 
is negligent in other matters cannot claim immunity simply because he is a parent." [d. The 
jury apportioned 40% of the causal negligence to the mother. [d. at 233, 201 N. W.2d at 747. 
191 [d. at 246-47,201 N.W.2d at 753. 
192 Id. at 246,201 N.W.2d at 753. 
193 See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) 
(en banc). Minnesota has also adopted the reasonable parent standard. See Anderson v. 
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 599-601 (Minn. 1980). The Anderson court abolished previous 
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isting classifications and encouraged by the Goller approach, abro-
gated parental immunity and replaced it with a reasonable parent 
standard in Gibson v. Gibson. l94 In Gibson, a child was struck by a 
vehicle after his father instructed him to go out on the highway and 
realign the wheels of the jeep being towed. 195 The court reasoned 
that, "although a parent has the prerogative and the duty to exercise 
authority over his minor child, this prerogative must be exercised 
within reasonable limits."196 Hence, the court abolished parental 
immunity, holding that a child may maintain an action for negligence 
against his or her parent. 197 The reasonable parent test applies to 
all parental conduct, and allows the factfinder to determine what an 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent would have done in a sim-
ilar circumstance. 198 
The American Law Institute advocates, in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, 199 a sixth approach to abrogating the doctrine of pa-
rental immunity. The Restatement provides that the parent-child 
relationship alone is not a proper basis for complete immunity. 200 
Certain acts or omissions, however, are privileged or non-tortious 
by reason of the parent-child relationship and therefore should not 
give rise to liability when injury results.201 Under the Restatement, 
parental discretion is privileged conduct.202 Acts of parental author-
parental immunity exceptions and adopted a reasonable parent standard. [d. at 598-601. In 
Anderson, an unsupervised child was injured when her leg was run over by a neighbor backing 
out of a shared common driveway. [d. at 596. 
194 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971). In reaching its 
decision, the court refuted the doctrinal underpinnings of the parental immunity doctrine. [d. 
at 918-21, 479 P.2d at 650-52, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 290-92. The court's decision to abrogate 
parental immunity also was influenced by other policy factors including: (1) the legal principle 
that "when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception," id. at 922, 
479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (quoting Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 
211, 219, 359 P.2d 457, 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1961)); and (2) the prevalence of liability 
insurance and its effects on intrafamilial actions, id. at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 
293. 
195 [d. at 916, 479 P.2d at 648-49, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89. 
196 [d. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. 
197 [d. 
198 See id. (emphasis in original). 
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979). 
200 [d. 
201 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G provides that: "(1) [a] parent or child is not 
immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship; (2) [r]epudiation 
of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because of 
the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious." [d. 
202 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 895G comment k (1979) (parental discipline is the 
only privileged conduct that triggers immunity regardless of injury). Comment k states: "The 
intimacies of family life also involve intended physical contacts that would be actionable 
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ity or supervision and parental discretion are essential to the parent-
child relationship.203 Thus, the Restatement directs courts to apply 
the reasonably prudent parent test when parental discretion is in-
volved and imposes liability only when the conduct is palpably un-
reasonable. 204 Currently, only the District of Columbia205 and the 
State of Oregon206 adhere to the Restatement view. 
The final two views to the parental immunity doctrine are those 
at the extremes. Nine states do not recognize any parent-child im-
munity,207 many reasoning that the doctrine cannot withstand logical 
scrutiny in modern life. 208 In contrast, fourteen states retain absolute 
parental immunity when the child's injuries result from the parent's 
negligence. 209 Many of these courts reason that it is better public 
policy to allow an occasional injury to go uncompensated than to 
encourage proceedings that are repugnant to family sanctity. 210 
The application of the various judicial approaches to parent-child 
immunity affects current lead paint litigation against the manufac-
turers only if the parent and child are adverse parties. Thus, this 
issue will arise whenever the child directly sues his or her parent, 
following the example of the lead paint manufacturers, or when the 
parent is brought in as a defendant through an impleader action. 
V. A STEP FORWARD TOWARD NATIONAL LEAD PAINT REMOVAL 
The consensus of legislative and judicial efforts in the area of lead 
paint poisoning has been to identify and remove the lead paint hazard 
from the environments of children. 211 Although federal and state 
between strangers but may be commonplace and expected within the family." Id. For example, 
a child who leaves toys in the middle of the floor, causing a family member to trip, should not 
have legal liability. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 See, e.g., Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 420-21 (D.C. 1987) (unemancipated minor 
has action against parents for negligent driving). 
206 See, e.g., Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 731-34, 681 P.2d 776,784-86 (1984) (when father 
has automobile accident killing his two daughters, he cannot claim a "privilege" to drive while 
intoxicated). The Restatement evaluates complaints "by criteria of tortiousness and privilege 
rather than by a doctrine of parental immunity from a child's legal action." Id. at 733, 681 
P.2d at 785. If the issue is "whether defendant's alleged conduct was either not tortious or 
privileged by virtue of the parental relationship, the complaints state a claim that survives a 
motion to dismiss." Id. at 734, 681 P.2d at 786. 
207 See supra note 146. 
208 See, e.g., Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376-79, 282 A.2d 351,353-55 (1971). 
209 See supra note 139. 
210 See, e.g., Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 223, 594 S.W.2d 853,854 (1980). 
211 See infra notes 214-28 and accompanying text. 
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legislators have promulgated statutes with this purpose in mind, 
their efforts to remove the lead hazard have been largely unsuc-
cessful. 212 Moreover, while courts could mandate lead paint abate-
ment in suits against landlords, most plaintiffs have asked courts 
only to award monetary relief in lead paint poisoning cases. 213 
Current suits against lead paint manufacturers likely will prove 
to be a mere extension of this case-by-case approach to the lead 
paint hazard, albeit with different defendants paying damages. Ad-
ditionally, in jurisdictions that have abrogated the parent-child im-
munity doctrine, there is a potential for manufacturers to limit their 
liability for personal injuries by seeking contribution from the chil-
dren's parents. The likelihood of successful contribution, of course, 
will depend on each court's relative application or restriction of the 
doctrine. Thus far, federal and state legislative efforts, as well as 
judicial resolution of common-law negligence actions against land-
lords have been ineffective in terms of promoting lead paint abate-
ment. 
A. Regulatory Attempts Ineffective 
1. Limitation of Federal Legislation 
The original Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act 
(LPPPA),214 passed in 1971, anticipated using federal funds to re-
move lead paint from privately owned structures. Under section 
4811 of the LPPP A, federal funds would be used for primary pre-
vention measures directed at eliminating lead paint prior to a child's 
contracting lead paint poisoning.215 This goal was never reached,216 
however, and the provision was repealed in 1978.217 Currently, the 
LPPP A's coverage is limited to public housing and other federally 
assisted housing,218 thus leaving a gap in regulation of the private 
housing market that state and local governments are left to address. 
Beyond the problem of the LPPP A's limited jurisdiction looms a 
larger financial issue. The United States Department of Health and 
212 See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra notes 56-113 and accompanying text. 
214 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (1988). 
215 42 U.S.C. § 4811 (repealed 1978). For text of § 4811 see Pub. L. No. 91-695, § 201, 84 
Stat. 2078 (1971). 
216 Ford & Gilligan, Investor Response to Lead-Based Paint Abatement Laws: Legal and 
Economic Considerations, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 251 (1987). 
217 42 U.S.C. § 4811 (repealed 1978). 
218 See id. § 4822. 
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Human Services estimates that approximately 308,000 public hous-
ing units covered under the LPPP A require lead abatement at a 
total cost of over $380 million. 219 The federal government has yet to 
dedicate funds in this amount and is faced with a difficult societal 
choice between allowing large numbers of young children to continue 
to be exposed to unacceptable levels of lead and appropriating money 
to eliminate the lead source systematically. 
2. Limitation of State Legislation 
Municipal and state regulations prohibiting use of lead paint in 
housing units and mandating retroactive abatement of lead paint 
have been sporadic and ineffective due to poor enforcement. 22o For 
example, Massachusetts enacted a statute banning lead paint in all 
housing units in which children younger than six years of age lived.221 
Minimal funding and intense opposition from real estate factions 
resulted in a program subjecting only one half of one percent of pre-
1940 housing units to lead removal over a four and one half year 
period. 222 Moreover, consistent with the nature of secondary preven-
tion measures, enforcement of the Massachusetts statute became 
reactive rather than proactive as intervention occurred only after 
lead poisoning had been diagnosed. 223 
Many state public health statutes grant tenants the right to sue 
their landlord for damages resulting from lead paint poisonIng after 
a landlord fails to satisfactorily abate a known lead paint hazard. 224 
However, the awarded damages often do not exceed the costs of 
abatement.225 Because lead paint poisoning is predominantly an in-
219 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-7-IX-8. Adding private housing to the 
estimated figures would increase the lead abatement costs enormously. Miller and Toulmin 
estimate that FHA single-family units alone will involve an outlay of $2.57 billion from 1987 
to 1991. Id. at IX-7. Approximately 95% of this amount will be paid by private-sector buyers 
and sellers. Id. 
220 Id. at IX-7 to IX-9. For a complete discussion of the state and local laws on lead-based 
paint abatement see Ford & Gilligan, supra note 216, at 267-78. 
221 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 197 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); see also LEAD 
POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-9 to IX-IO. 
222 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-9, IX-I0 table IX-4. 
223 See id. at IX-lO; see also supra text accompanying notes 35-38. 
224 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
225 See, e.g., Davis v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 912, 913, 921 (La. Ct. App. 1969) 
(total awarded damages for pain, suffering, and total disability was $115,000); Norwood v. 
Lazarus, 634 S. W.2d 584, 585, 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (total compensation for injuries 
sustained and resultant treatments was $9350); Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., 38 Misc. 2d 
859,861,238 N. Y.S.2d 713, 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (total compensation for injuries sustained 
and hospital bills was $4320). HUD initially estimated in 1975 that it would cost approximately 
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ner-city disease, many of its victims are relatively poor.226 Thus, a 
significant number of victims of lead paint poisoning cannot afford 
legal representation, and consequently remain either unaware of 
their right to sue or unable to pursue court action. Because of this 
limitation, the multi-unit landlord simply chooses to pay the damages 
for those lead-poisoned children who are successful in their suits 
rather than incur the significantly higher expense of unit-wide lead 
removal. 227 
B. Limitation of Judicial Action in Common-Law Negligence 
Actions Against Landlords 
The judicial response to common-law negligence suits against 
owner-landlords has had little, if any, effect on lead paint abatement. 
As outlined above, the past lead paint litigation has been ineffective 
for a number of social, economic, and legal reasons. Even assuming 
that some judicial decisions have prompted owner-landlords to abate 
their lead hazard, this case-by-case approach to lead removal is an 
impractical and ineffective method to combat a national health haz-
ard. Current suits targeting lead paint manufacturers228 threaten to 
become an extension of this ad hoc approach toward lead paint 
removal. Further, in those jurisdictions where a manufacturer can 
reduce its liability through parental contribution, it is doubtful that 
these suits will prompt lead paint manufacturers to remove the lead 
hazard. 
C. Courts' Responses to Manufacturers' Actions to Limit Liability 
The success of a manufacturer's attempt to implead parents as 
third-party defendants based on comparative negligence, or a child's 
attempt to sue his or her parent and a lead paint manufacturer 
jointly, depends upon the particular jurisdiction's approach to the 
$2000 per unit to remove all lead paint and to repaint the unit for pre-1940 multi-family 
dwellings. See Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act of 1975: Hearings on S.1664 Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 221 (1975) (statement of Dr. Robert Klein, Director, Massachusetts Childhood Lead 
Poisoning Prevention Program). This figure was later reduced to a high of $1072 per unit. See 
Ford & Gilligan, supra note 216, at 257-58. For a complete discussion of abatement costs see 
id. at 256-58, 282-87. The Ford & Gilligan article argues that, in a realistic real estate market, 
the public has no obligation to pay for the cost of lead abatement because this expense already 
has been calculated into the real estate market price. Id. at 290. 
226 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at V-7 to V-16; see also PREVENTING LEAD 
POISONING, supra note 31, at 3. 
227 See supra note 225. 
228 See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. 
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parent-child immunity doctrine. Potential outcomes run the spec-
trum from no contribution by parents to total parental financial 
responsibility. Any result that allows for contribution by the child's 
parents would defeat the ultimate purpose of these suits. 
Jurisdictions, such as Mississippi, that retain absolute parental 
immunity will preclude a minor child from directly suing his or her 
parents for tortious injury due to lead paint poisoning.229 An action 
in which a lead paint manufacturer impleads parents as third-party 
defendants creates adversity between the child-plaintiff and his or 
her parents. Such adversity is expressly barred under the parent-
child immunity doctrine. 23o Thus, a lead paint manufacturer would 
be prohibited from impleading parents as co-defendants. Likewise, 
in an action by an injured child against his or her parent and a lead 
paint manufacturer jointly, direct adversity clearly exists between 
the parent and child. Once again, jurisdictions retaining absolute 
parental immunity will bar a child from suing his or her parents, 
leaving only the manufacturers. 
Conversely, jurisdictions that have either totally abrogated the 
parent-child immunity doctrine or never adopted it impose no im-
mediate bar to a minor child's suing his or her parents for tortious 
injury.231 Thus, in the context of suits against a lead paint manufac-
turer, the manufacturer is free to implead parents as co-defendants, 
and a court is likely to apportion damages according to relative 
fault. 232 Furthermore, a child would have no procedural difficulty in 
suing his or her parents individually for negligent parental super-
vision. 
In those jurisdictions, such as N ew York, that have replaced 
absolute immunity with a grant of immunity only where duty arises 
from the parent-child relationship, courts must decide whether a 
parent's duty to supervise his or her child is a public duty or uniquely 
a familial duty.233 If the court determines that a parent's duty to 
supervise his or her child is uniquely a familial duty, as did the Court 
229 See supra note 139 and text accompanying note 147. 
230 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 122, at 904. 
231 See supra note 146. 
232 Other related issues, however, ultimately may affect a parent's contribution. For ex-
ample, many states have enacted statutes that prohibit a parent's negligence from being 
imputed to a child. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-1(b) (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
231, § 85D (West 1986); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 488(1) (1965); PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 68, § 74, at 531--32. In such states, a battle likely will ensue to determine 
whether a parent's negligence is the superseding cause of his or her child's injuries because 
such a finding would discharge or limit the manufacturer's liability. See infra notes 257-64 
and accompanying text; supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text. 
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of Appeals of New york in Holodook v. Spencer,234 then immunity 
would be invoked. This-immunity would prohibit the lead manufac-
turer from successfully joining the parent as a co-defendant and 
would likewise prohibit the child from directly suing his or her parent 
for negligent supervision. If a court reasons that a parent's duty to 
supervise his or her child is a duty owed to the public, however, 
then no immunity exists, and the manufacturer may join the child's 
parents as co-defendants to share in the payment of damages. 
The Goller approach presents the most difficulty in predicting the 
success of a manufacturer's action for contribution.235 This difficulty 
stems from the wide variation in interpretations of the scope of the 
Goller exceptions. In jurisdictions following a narrow reading of the 
Goller exceptions, such as Wisconsin,286 parental supervision is 
viewed as an ordinary act of upbringing and is not of the same legal 
nature as the provision of food, housing, clothing, and medical and 
dental care.237 In such jurisdictions, courts do not recognize negligent 
parental supervision as an exception to the general abrogation of 
parental immunity. Thus, when a lead paint manufacturer joins a 
child's parent as a co-defendant, the parent will not be immune from 
suit by his or her child. Consequently, the lead paint manufacturer 
has the potential of lessening its liability due to the comparative 
negligence of the parent. 
In practice, however, the manufacturer does not have the sym-
pathy of the jury. The jury probably will have the vision of a deep-
pocket lead paint manufacturer trying to shift the blame and resul-
tant financial burden onto the innocent parent. This element will 
plague manufacturers regardless of what approach to immunity the 
court applies. 
Alternatively, in jurisdictions following an expansive interpreta-
tion of the Goller exceptions, parental supervision will be viewed as 
a protected function guaranteeing parental immunity.238 For exam-
ple, the Court of Appeals of Michigan, following its decision in Paige 
v. Bing Construction Co. ,239 would reason that a parent's responsi-
bility to supervise his or her minor child closely enough to prevent 
lead paint ingestion is a right of the parent to exercise authority 
284 36 N.Y.2d 35,51,324 N.E.2d 338,346,364 N.Y.S.2d 859,872 (1974). 
235 See supra note 164-92 and accompanying text. 
238 See Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 245-47, 201 
N.W.2d 745,753 (1972); see supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text. 
237 See Thoreson, 56 Wis. 2d at 246-47,201 N.W.2d at 753. 
238 See supra notes 173-84 and accompanying text. 
239 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975). 
1991] LEAD PAINT LITIGATION 413 
over his or her child.240 As such, negligent parental supervision falls 
within an exception to the general rule of abrogation, and immunity 
would shield the parent from an impleader action by the manufac-
turer, as well as a direct suit brought by the child. Additionally, if 
Wisconsin were to revert back to its reasoning in Lemmen v. Ser-
vais,241 it would reason that a parent's failure to instruct effectively 
his or her minor child not to eat lead paint fell within the exercise 
of ordinary parental discretion with respect to other care of the 
child.242 By falling within this exception, parental immunity would 
bar the parent from being a co-defendant in any suit brought by his 
or her child. Thus, the lead paint manufacturer would be unable to 
limit its liability through parental contribution. 
In those jurisdictions adhering to the reasonable parent standard, 
a jury must decide whether a reasonable and prudent parent would 
have supervised his or her child closely enough to prevent ingestion 
of lead paint chips.243 Clearly, this approach is significantly more 
attentive than the others to the particular facts of each lead poisoning 
case. Thus, the parents would argue that it is impossible for even a 
reasonably prudent parent to know what his or her child is doing all 
of the time, despite utmost vigilance. The defendants, in contrast, 
would argue that if the parents were aware of the existence of lead 
paint in their home, then the parents should be held to a higher 
standard of supervision over their child. Therefore, this approach 
requires a fact-specific balancing test, and, ultimately, each case will 
be uniquely resolved depending upon a jury's decision as to whether 
a reasonably prudent parent could have supervised his or her child 
closely enough to prevent lead paint poisoning. 
Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Torts advocates that although 
the parent-child relationship alone is not a sufficient basis for abso-
lute immunity, acts of parental authority or supervision are essential 
to the parent-child relationship and thus are privileged acts.244 Such 
privileged acts shield the parent from liability whenever a child is 
injured. Thus, under the Restatement approach, a parent who neg-
ligently supervises his or her child, resulting in the child's contract-
ing lead paint poisoning, is shielded from liability because of this 
240 See id. at 484,233 N.W.2d at 48-49. 
241 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968). 
242 See id. at 78, 158 N. W.2d at 343. 
243 See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,921,479 P.2d 648,653,92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 
(1971) (en banc). 
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G & comment k (1979). 
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privileged status. An action impleading the parents for contribution 
would not be allowed in jurisdictions adhering to this view. 245 
The various approaches to the parental immunity doctrine will 
lead to diverse results throughout the United States in any lead 
paint litigation in which the parent is an adverse party to the injured 
child. Inconsistent judicial responses will not provide the necessary 
impetus to mobilize the lead paint manufacturers toward wide-scale 
abatement and therefore warrant an intermediate uniform judicial 
approach followed by comprehensive state and federal legislation. 
D. Factors That Transcend the Jurisdictional Approach and 
Justify a Uniform Judicial Response to Manufacturers' Actions to 
Limit Their Liability 
Notwithstanding the various jurisdictional approaches to parental 
immunity, lead paint manufacturers should be barred from implead-
ing or counterclaiming against a child's parents for contribution be-
cause of several factors that transcend jurisdictional approaches. 246 
These factors include: (1) the factual nature of lead paint poisoning; 
(2) the foreseeability of childhood lead paint poisoning; (3) the sta-
tutory law, in most states, prohibiting a parent's negligence from 
being imputed to the child; and (4) the broad socio-environmental 
goals associated with the current trend in lead paint litigation against 
the lead industry. These factors should be considered by any court 
prior to applying the particular jurisdictional approach to parental 
immunity. 
1. The Factual Nature of Lead Paint Poisoning 
Initially, courts must look to the specific factual circumstances 
surrounding lead paint poisoning cases and distinguish these circum-
stances from similar suits against parents for personal injury. Such 
a comparison yields a number of significant differences including: 
that lead is a latent toxin;247 that lead poisoning occurs within the 
home, an area uniquely associated with safety and security; and that 
246 See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text. 
246 Procedurally, a lead pigment manufacturer, by impleading a parent as a third-party 
defendant, creates a suit in which the child opposes the manufacturer and the parent. A 
manufacturer's action to counterclaim creates a suit in which the manufacturer opposes the 
parent, which, in turn, raises the issue whether or not a child can directly sue his or her 
parent for negligent supervision. 
247 See generally CHANNING L. BETE Co., supra note 4, at 7. 
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ingestion of minimal amounts of lead paint over a short time span 
has permanent, irreversible health effects. 248 
First, lead is a latent household hazard, unlike more familiar pat-
ent indoor hazards. For example, a gas stove, an electrical outlet, a 
staircase, and household cleaning products all present obvious dan-
gers to any young child, and, therefore, a cautious parent will su-
pervise his or her child more closely to prevent contact with these 
hazards. Furthermore, a comparison of lead paint with outdoor haz-
ards reveals that outdoor hazards are obvious to a parent in a way 
similar to patent indoor hazards. A parent who allows his or her 
child to play outside unattended clearly risks that the child may be 
struck by an automobile or a train or fall into a nearby body of water. 
Thus, parents who live on a busy street might erect a fence in order 
to protect their child from obvious danger. Lead, on the other hand, 
hides under the surfaces of every wall and on the ground as paint 
drips and cracks from walls or ceilings, possibly unnoticed by even 
an observant parent until a child is diagnosed with lead paint poi-
soning. The parent has no warning of an impending disaster. 
The home is a place uniquely associated with safety and security. 
Thus, it is natural for parents to lower their guard when inside their 
home. Where lead paint is concerned, this sense of security is false 
because a child could easily ingest unacceptable amounts of paint 
chips without the parent's ever noticing it happening. Most parents 
believe, however, that, by closing the front door, they are shutting 
out the hazardous environment outside. 
Finally, a child who ingests lead paint is exposing his or her body 
to massive doses of the metal. A child ingesting a few small chips a 
day is ingesting more than one hundred times the tolerable amount 
for an adult. 249 Further, because lead accumulates in a child's body 
over his or her lifetime, a child need not be exposed to major amounts 
of lead paint at one sitting for a health hazard to exist. 250 Repeated 
exposure to even low levels of lead over a few months will result in 
elevated blood lead levels. This exposure to lead at chronic low doses 
presents a serious threat to a child's central nervous system. 251 It is 
now known that lead's effects on the central nervous system are 
long-term, persisting into a child's adult life,252 well after the lead 
248 See supra notes 5, 26--30 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
250 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. 
251 Needleman, supra note 5, at 83. 
252 [d. 
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has been removed from the child's body through chelation treat-
ment.253 
Considering these three factors together, it is impossible to expect 
that any reasonably prudent parent can prevent lead paint poisoning, 
short of requiring the parent to keep watch over the child every 
moment during the day or night.254 To require such supervision 
would make a parent a prisoner to his or her child. 
2. The Foreseeability of Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning 
The lead paint manufacturers, by continuing to produce and mar-
ket a known hazardous product,255 wrote their own prescription for 
disaster. Following the landlord-defendant's example, the lead paint 
manufacturers have claimed that the ingestion of paint chips was an 
unforeseeable use of their product.256 This approach might have been 
a valid defense in the 1960s, but in the 1990s the courts' stance must 
reflect the increase in public knowledge concerning lead paint poi-
soning. Today, not only should the lead paint industry foresee that 
children will ingest lead paint chips; they should expect it. 
3. Statutory Prohibition of Imputing the Parent's Negligence to 
the Child 
Most states have statutes generally providing that the negligence 
of a parent cannot be imputed to his or her child.267 Such statutes, 
however, do not relieve a parent from all supervisory responsibilities 
2a8 Chelation treatment involves administering chelating agents by injection. Chisolm, supra 
note 3, at 22. Chelating agents remove lead atoms from the tissues of a child's body for 
excretion through the kidney and liver. [d. Chelation treatment allows high levels of lead in 
tissue to be rapidly reduced to normal levels. Follow-up therapy includes oral doses of another 
agent. [d. For a complete discussion of chelation treatment for childhood lead paint poisoning, 
see Piomelli, Rosen, Chisolm & Graef, Management o/Childhood Lead Poisoning, 105 (4) J. 
PEDIATRICS 523 (1984). 
264 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 452 (1965) (third person's failure to 
prevent harm). Even when a parent is aware of the lead hazard in his or her home, these 
three factors make it impossible to protect the child from repeated poisoning. Most parents 
of children already diagnosed with lead paint poisoning have limited options available to 
prevent repeated poisoning. More likely than not, these parents cannot afford to relocate their 
family or remove the lead from their home. Often, the most these parents can do is to arrange 
their furniture to prevent or deter a child from accessing fallen paint chips. Telephone inter-
view with Mary Jean Brown, Assistant Director for the Department of Public Health, Child-
hood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, Massachusetts Department of Health and Human 
Services, in Boston, Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 1989). 
2M See McKhann & Vogt, Lead Poisoning in Children, 101 J.A.M.A. 1131 & n.5 (1933). 
266 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
257 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-1(b) (1982); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 231, § 85D (West 
1986). 
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over his or her child. In extraordinary situations, when a parent's 
negligence constitutes an independent and superseding cause258 of 
the child's injuries, the negligent acts of the paint manufacturers 
may be reduced or discharged.259 In lead paint poisoning cases, the 
manufacturers may argue that the failure of the parent to make 
physical arrangements that would prevent his or her child's access 
to the lead paint chips or the failure to supervise his or her child 
closely enough to prevent ingestion of paint chips is a superseding 
cause of the injury. Thus, the lead paint manufacturers' negligence 
would be only the proximate cause of the child's injuries. 260 
In order for the lead paint manufacturers to succeed in this claim, 
they must prove that their alleged negligence was not the immediate 
cause of the child's injuries, and that the negligent acts of the parents 
intervened. Further, the manufacturers must prove that they had 
no reason to anticipate that the child's parents would be unable to 
prevent lead paint ingestion. The lead paint manufacturers, how-
ever, will have difficulty denying the history of childhood lead paint 
poisoning. Although as a nation we are more knowledgeable of the 
danger of lead paint poisoning, the incidence of chronic poisoning 
has only decreased moderately.261 Thus, a reasonably prudent parent 
who is unable to move his or her family away from the lead hazard 
cannot practically prevent his or her child from injury. Depending 
on the statutory language and the particular state's interpretation 
of that language, this issue may be decided as a matter of law262 or 
as a matter of fact.263 In either instance, negligent parental super-
vision in lead paint poisoning cases cannot rise to the threshold of 
an independent and superseding cause of the child's injuries. 264 
258 A "superseding cause" is "an intervening act or acts of negligence which operate to 
insulate an antecedent tort-feasor from liability for negligently causing a dangerous condition 
which results in injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 749 (abr. 5th ed. 1983). 
259 See Caroline v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125, 135-36, 304 A.2d 831, 837 (1972). See generally 
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 44. 
260 The "proximate cause" is "that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken 
by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not 
have occurred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 641 (abr. 5th ed. 1983). 
261 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at V-28, V-29 table V-16. 
262 See, e.g., Caroline, 269 Md. at 131, 304 A.2d at 834 (court decided as a matter of law 
that the negligence of the parents was not a superseding cause of the child's lead poisoning). 
263 [d. Usually the determination of whether a third party's intervening act is a superseding 
cause of the injury, which would discharge the original actor from liability, is a question 
answered by the jury. [d. In situations such as Caroline, however, if the court determines 
from the evidence presented that there is only one conclusion, the issue may be decided by 
the judge as a matter of law. [d. 
264 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 68, § 44, at 318 (discussion of intervening causes 
with respect to other dangerous products); see also supra notes 258-60 and accompanying 
text. 
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4. The Socioenvironmental Goals Behind Actions Against Lead 
Paint Manufacturers 
Allowing lead paint manufacturers to limit their liability by or-
dering parental contribution is contrary to the socioenvironmental 
goals of removing lead from our homes and the reach of our children. 
Although the immediate goal of the pending litigation in Massachu-
setts is to compensate injured children and their families, the 
broader goal mandates that the lead paint industry recognize their 
responsibility for lead paint poisoning and take affirmative measures 
to prevent future poisoning. 
Millions of potential plaintiffs265 around the country are awaiting 
disposition of the pending Massachusetts cases. 266 If these cases are 
decided favorably for the plaintiffs, it is likely that the lead paint 
industry will perform a cost-benefit analysis, balancing the potential 
legal fees, damages, and negative implication on their public image 
against the cost to abate the lead paint hazard across the United 
States.267 In order to tip the scale in favor of lead paint removal, the 
judiciary should send a united message to the lead paint manufac-
turers by assessing maximum damages whenever possible. A state's 
interest in protecting the health and well-being of its citizens should 
justify this stringent judicial response. Accordingly, courts should 
not allow the scales to be tipped in the opposite direction by allowing 
parental contribution to reduce the manufacturers' personal injury 
liability. 
If the plaintiffs in the Massachusetts suits prevail and the courts 
award the requested damages, the manufacturers may be forced to 
develop and institute a nationwide lead removal program for their 
own survival. For example, in LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams CO.,268 
the plaintiffs requested $2.5 million in compensatory and punitive 
damages in addition to interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys 
fees. 269 Considering the widespread incidence of childhood lead paint 
poisoning and the precedent established if the court decides in the 
plaintiff's favor, there will be many future plaintiffs. Although mil-
lion-dollar verdicts are not likely to be commonplace, one or two 
may be enough to chasten the manufacturers and encourage a rea-
sonable abatement response. 
266 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
267 See Ford & Gilligan, supra note 216, at 256-58. 
268 LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 86-35232 (Mass. Super. Ct., Worcester County 
filed Aug. 15, 1986). 
269 Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, supra note 110, at 29. 
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Although a united judicial response against the lead paint industry 
would not guarantee lead removal from our indoor environment, it 
would make the lead paint industry take notice. Because there is no 
precedent for such uniform judicial reform, however, it is likely that 
if left to the judiciary, a garden variety of responses regarding 
parental contribution will result. Courts are not likely to deny con-
tribution unless there is some implication of the parent-child immu-
nity doctrine preventing parents and children from being on opposite 
sides of a suit. 270 In the tradition of tort law, there may be fifty 
different judicial responses regarding the question of parental con-
tribution as a means for limiting the lead paint manufacturers' lia-
bility. 
E. A Comprehensive State and Federal Legislative Response 
The possibility of continued ad hoc solutions to the lead paint 
hazard and its unacceptable effects on the health of this nation's 
children necessitates a comprehensive state and federal legislative 
response. To begin this legislative process, state legislators must 
respond to the manufacturers' attempt to limit their personal injury 
liability through claims of parental negligence. This response would 
be most effective as a uniform act, proposed for adoption by the fifty 
states,271 amending current product liability laws to acknowledge the 
realities oflead paint poisoning. 272 Specifically, a Uniform Lead Paint 
Liability Act (Act) must be adopted to preclude, among other things, 
lead paint manufacturers from asserting claims of negligent parental 
supervision against a child's parents, whether by way of impleader 
or counterclaim. A unanimous adoption of this Act by the states 
would serve as legislative acknowledgment that a reasonably pru-
dent parent cannot supervise his or her child closely enough to 
prevent lead paint poisoning. 
In addition, federal legislation must respond to the broader na-
tional goal of removing lead paint from our indoor environment.273 
270 See, e.g., Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 408 Mass. 792, 796, 563 N.E.2d 684 (1990). 
271 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws appoints committees 
to draft such legislation. Examples of such legislation include the Uniform Commercial Code 
and the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act. 
272 See supra notes 247--56 and accompanying text. 
273 Currently, section 118(f)(2) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) requires the EPA to "score and evaluate specific sites at which children are known 
to be exposed to environmental sources of lead due to releases, utilizing the Hazard Ranking 
System [HRS] of the National Priorities List [NPL]." SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 118(0(2), 
100 Stat. 1613, 1657 (1986); see also LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at X-I. The 
HRS sets up criteria for determining priorities among hazardous substance releases through-
out the United States for the purpose of taking remedial action. LEAD POISONING REPORT, 
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This legislation must compel lead paint manufacturers to assume 
financial responsibility for the cleanup expenses associated with re-
moval of lead paint from all residential housing units. By placing a 
known hazardous product into the stream of commerce, which they 
fully expected to be used in our homes, the lead paint manufacturers' 
actions are analogous to those of dumpers of outdoor toxic waste 
and should be treated similarly. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA)274 establishes a comprehensive response 
program for the cleanup up of thousands of hazardous waste sites 
for past hazardous waste activities. 275 Under CERCLA's liability 
scheme, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may pay for 
waste site remediation and later recover the money expended from 
responsible parties. 276 Such responsible parties include generators 
who disposed of waste at the site, either directly or indirectly. 277 
Similar federal legislation targeting the lead paint manufacturers 
as generators of a hazardous product that is deposited inside our 
homes is necessary. Congress must set up an Indoor Lead Paint 
Hazard Abatement Fund, analogous to the Superfund, but tailored 
to the needs of indoor lead paint abatement. To do so, Congress 
must appropriate general revenue funds, as well as revenue pro-
supra note 1, at X-l. The HRS assesses lead that has been released into the ground, surface 
water, or air and ranks sites against others on the basis of the "estimated relative threat to 
human health and the environment." [d. The system's primary criterion, however, is the 
migration of contaminants from a site via air, surface water, or groundwater, and consequences 
of that migration. [d. at X-I to X-2. The HRS is not an assessment of the health risks at the 
site. [d. at X-2. The EPA assessed an outdoor residential area designated by the City of 
Boston as an Emergency Lead Poisoning Area using the HRS. [d. at X-4. Because the site 
posed no hazard from migration oflead, it only scored a 3.56. [d. Under current EPA policy, 
the minimum HRS score for listing on the National Priorities List is 28.5. [d.; see also J.G. 
ARBUCKLE, N. BRYSON, D. CASE, C. CHERNEY, R. HALL, J. MARTIN, J. MILLER, 
M. MILLER, W. PEDERSEN, R. RANDLE, R. STOLL, T. SULLIVAN & T. VANDERVER, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 81-82 (10th ed. 1989) [hereinafter T. SULLIVAN]. The lead 
hazard sites that are listed on the NPL are those that have shown migration of lead from the 
site and are usually abandoned dumping areas. LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at 
X-11. 
274 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
275 T. SULLIVAN, supra note 273, at 75. 
276 [d. at 94, 97. Responsible parties cover not only the actual removal and rehabilitation 
costs, but also the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIIFS) and design costs. 
[d. at 94. CERCLA also provides for waste site remedies to be paid for from the Superfund 
trust fund. [d. The majority of the funding for the Superfund was raised by special industry 
taxes. [d. at 123. As of 1986, these Superfund taxes apply to a large segment of United States 
manufacturing corporations. [d. 
277 [d. at 94. Other responsible parties include: past and present owners or operators of 
the site, and parties who transported the waste to the site. [d. Many courts have found joint 
and several liability although Congress provides in its 1986 amendments for contribution 
rights to sue during or following the EPA's litigation. [d. at 115-16. 
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duced from a special tax on current United States paint manufac-
turers. Because of the difficulty in identifying which lead paint man-
ufacturer's product was applied to a given property, the EPA would 
not be able to sue a particular lead paint manufacturer for abatement 
cost recovery, as is done under CERCLA.278 Thus, the fund must 
be substantial enough to pay the full expense of lead paint removal 
and restoration of the residential premises. 279 
Further, this legislation must ensure a nationwide lead removal 
plan to establish criteria for prioritizing lead paint cleanup sites by 
area. These ranking criteria should include: the prevalence of lead 
paint in the area; the number of incidents of childhood lead paint 
poisoning in the area, acknowledging the various levels of poisoning; 
the number of children residing in the area; and the accessibility of 
lead paint to children in that area. Given the statistics associated 
with lead paint poisoning, it is likely that older urban areas will 
dominate the higher priority sites.280 Eventually, however, all resi-
dential areas identified as a threat to the health of children must be 
scheduled for lead paint removal. 
In summary, uniform state legislation that precludes lead paint 
manufacturers from bringing forth claims of negligent parental su-
pervision would assure consistency and predictability among state 
court decisions. This legislation would send a uniform message to 
the lead paint manufacturers that such a tactic will not be tolerated 
given the unique circumstances surrounding lead paint poisoning. 
Broader federal legislation must promote the removal of lead paint 
from our homes by compelling the lead paint industry to pay for all 
abatement expenses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lead in paint is a pervasive toxic that is not merely a problem of 
neglected urban housing areas. Lead paint poisoning affects children 
278 This theory would be consistent with market share liability as found in Sindell v. Abbott, 
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), em. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), 
where the court apportioned liability for a product determined to be defective based on the 
share of the market because it was impossible to identify whose particular product was used. 
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937~8, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. 
279 The fund should assess Indoor Lead Hazard Abatement taxes on the paint manufacturers 
annually. Additionally, as with Superfund, the amount of the taxes may be reevaluated once 
the cleanup costs and the expansiveness of the hazard are fully known. See 42 U. S. C. § 9611 
(1988). In 1980, CERCLA was designed to generate $1.6 billion from special industry taxes 
over a five-year period. The 1986 amendments were designed to raise an additional nine billion 
dollars over a five-year period. See T. SULLIVAN, supra note 273, at 123. 
280 See LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-10 to 1-12, 1-13 table 1-3. 
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in all demographic and economic strata.281 According to the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, there is little, if any, margin 
of safety between existing lead levels in residences in large areas of 
the United States and those levels of lead associated with toxicity 
risk. 282 
Prevention of childhood lead paint poisoning requires abatement 
of the lead paint hazard in all housing markets. The financial re-
sponsibility for abatement rests with the lead paint manufacturers, 
particularly because of evidence that they have known of its asso-
ciated risks for sixty years. The lead paint manufacturers, however, 
have denied any responsibility and, alternatively, have asserted that, 
if they are found responsible, the child-victim's parents are contri-
butorily negligent. 
Inconsistencies in the jurisdictional approaches to the parent-child 
immunity doctrine will result in diverse responses regarding paren-
tal contribution. Considering the factors that transcend the individ-
ual jurisdictional approaches, it is clear that the lead paint manufac-
turers have no grounds for limiting their liabilty in this manner. 
Therefore, the pending Massachusetts litigation highlights the need 
for uniform state legislation precluding lead paint manufacturers 
from asserting claims of negligent supervision by way of impleader 
or counterclaim against the child's parents. For the time being, state 
courts should adopt an intermediate uniform approach to this liti-
gation and disallow any parental contribution. 
Moreover, if this nation is going to combat the lead paint hazard 
in its homes, Congress must enact legislation mandating widespread 
lead paint removal funded by the paint industry. The lead paint 
manufacturers placed a known hazardous product into the stream of 
commerce for use inside our homes. In doing so, the lead paint 
manufacturers became indoor toxic polluters and should be treated 
as such. Congress must send a clear message to the lead paint 
manufacturers that they will pay. Without comprehensive federal 
legislation addressing the indoor lead paint hazard, large numbers 
of children will continue to be exposed to persistent and massive 
doses of lead in their daily environment. Thus, this legislation is 
essential to preserving the health of future generations of children. 
281 LEAD POISONING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-12. 
282 I d. at 16. 
